The core of a strategic game

DOI10.1515/bejte-2017-0155OpenAlexW2800700608WikidataQ129980012 ScholiaQ129980012MaRDI QIDQ2098982

Parkash Chander

Publication date: 22 November 2022

Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2017-0155

zbMATH Keywords

partition functioncorerepeated gameNash programstrategic game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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Subgame-perfect cooperation in an extensive game, Stability of the merger-to-monopoly and a core concept for partition function games

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