Sustaining cooperation through strategic self-interested actions

DOI10.1515/bejte-2017-0157OpenAlexW2895938744WikidataQ129159266 ScholiaQ129159266MaRDI QIDQ2098991

Alessia Russo, Francesco Lancia

Publication date: 22 November 2022

Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2017-0157

zbMATH Keywords

organizationsimperfect monitoringlimited enforcementintergenerational cooperation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring
• Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
• Cooperation in Ongoing Organizations
• On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• Repeated Games Played by Overlapping Generations of Players
• Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations

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