Profits under centralized negotiations: the efficient bargaining case

DOI10.1515/BEJTE-2017-0176OpenAlexW2903911020WikidataQ128813021 ScholiaQ128813021MaRDI QIDQ2098993

Domenico Buccella, Luciano Fanti

Publication date: 22 November 2022

Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2017-0176

zbMATH Keywords

efficient bargainingcentralized bargainingconjectural variation model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items (1)

Downstream competition and profits under different input price bargaining structures

Cites Work

• Informal incentive labour contracts and product market competition
• Price vs. quantity competition in a vertically related market
• Endogenous choice of price or quantity contract and the implications of two-part-tariff in a vertical structure
• Cournot vs. Bertrand under centralised bargaining
• A Note on the Equivalence of the Conjectural Variations Solution and the Coefficient of Cooperation

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