Stable matching with double infinity of workers and firms

DOI10.1515/bejte-2018-0015OpenAlexW2904540890MaRDI QIDQ2098995

Fernando A. Tohmé, Matías N. Fuentes

Publication date: 22 November 2022

Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2018-0015

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencyasymptotic stabilitymatchingstopological dualitydouble infinity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68) Labor markets (91B39)

Cites Work

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• Perfect competition in the continuous assignment model
• On equilibrium allocations as distributions on the commodity space
• The nonatomic assignment model
• The core of a game with a continuum of players and finite coalitions: The model and some results
• The nonemptiness of the \(f\)-core of a game without side payments
• The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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