A first price auction with an arbitrary number of asymmetric bidders

DOI10.1515/BEJTE-2018-0105OpenAlexW2902974357WikidataQ128815622 ScholiaQ128815622MaRDI QIDQ2098997

Domenico Menicucci, Nicola Doni

Publication date: 22 November 2022

Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2018-0105

zbMATH Keywords

first price auctionasymmetric bidders

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Two-bidder all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations, including the highly competitive case
• Asymmetric first-price auctions with uniform distributions: analytic solutions to the general case
• Ranking sealed high-bid and open asymmetric auctions
• Characterization and computation of Nash-equilibria for auctions with incomplete information
• A Mechanism Design Approach to Ranking Asymmetric Auctions
• Revenue Comparison in Asymmetric Auctions with Discrete Valuations
• Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions

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