From jungle to civilized economy: the power foundation of exchange economy equilibrium
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Publication:2098999
DOI10.1515/bejte-2017-0085OpenAlexW2949965312MaRDI QIDQ2098999
Publication date: 22 November 2022
Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2017-0085
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
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