Reasoning about `when' instead of `what': collusive equilibria with stochastic timing in repeated oligopoly
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Publication:2099010
DOI10.1515/BEJTE-2018-0038OpenAlexW2963692394WikidataQ127444576 ScholiaQ127444576MaRDI QIDQ2099010
Justin Grana, James Bono, David H. Wolpert
Publication date: 22 November 2022
Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2018-0038
Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)
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Cites Work
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