Pricing, signalling, and sorting with frictions

DOI10.1515/bejte-2018-0108OpenAlexW2952121665WikidataQ127681758 ScholiaQ127681758MaRDI QIDQ2099029

Klaus Kultti, Mats Godenhielm, Tuomo Virkola

Publication date: 22 November 2022

Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2018-0108

zbMATH Keywords

sortingsignallingdirected searchheterogeneous buyersendogenous types

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Heterogeneous agent models (91B69)

Cites Work

• Signaling quality through prices in an oligopoly
• Sorting versus screening: search frictions and competing mechanisms
• Pricing and signaling with frictions
• DIRECTED SEARCH AND THE BERTRAND PARADOX
• Sorting and Decentralized Price Competition
• Noncontractible Heterogeneity in Directed Search
• Ex Ante Price Offers in Matching Games Non-Steady States
• A Directed Search Model of Inequality with Heterogeneous Skills and Skill?Biased Technology
• Frictional assignment. I: Efficiency

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