The core in Bertrand oligopoly TU-games with transferable technologies

DOI10.1515/bejte-2018-0197OpenAlexW2953415708MaRDI QIDQ2099043

Aymeric Lardon

Publication date: 22 November 2022

Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2018-0197

zbMATH Keywords

coreconvexity propertyBertrand oligopoly TU-gamestransferable technologies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items (3)

Convexity of Bertrand oligopoly TU-games with differentiated products ⋮ Stable allocations for choice-based collaborative price setting ⋮ Relationship between labeled network games and other cooperative games arising from attributes situations

Cites Work

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• Oligopoly games with and without transferable technologies.
• Cooperative oligopoly games with boundedly rational firms
• Expectation formation rules and the core of partition function games
• Convexity of oligopoly games without transferable technologies
• Cores of convex games

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