Behavioral theory of repeated prisoner's dilemma: generous tit-for-tat strategy

DOI10.1515/bejte-2019-0030OpenAlexW2935910307WikidataQ126805973 ScholiaQ126805973MaRDI QIDQ2099044

Hitoshi Matsushima

Publication date: 22 November 2022

Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2019-0030

zbMATH Keywords

reciprocityrepeated prisoner's dilemmaimperfect private monitoringbehavioral equilibriumgenerous tit-for-tat strategynaïveté

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (1)

Accuracy and retaliation in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring: experiments

Cites Work

• Community enforcement when players observe partners' past play
• The repeated prisoner's dilemma with imperfect private monitoring
• A robust folk theorem for the prisoner's dilemma
• A theory of sequential reciprocity
• Trust, reciprocity, and social history
• Patience or fairness? Analyzing social preferences in repeated games
• Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests
• Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: Two Players

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