Public good indices for games with several levels of approval

DOI10.1515/bejte-2019-0068OpenAlexW2980875669WikidataQ127018014 ScholiaQ127018014MaRDI QIDQ2099048

Bertrand Tchantcho, Sébastien Courtin

Publication date: 22 November 2022

Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2019-0068

zbMATH Keywords

public good index\((j\)2) gamesnull player free indexshift index

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Public goods (91B18)

Related Items (1)

Axiomatizing the public good index via merging and new arrival properties

Cites Work

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