Endogenous authority and enforcement in public goods games

DOI10.1515/bejte-2019-0057OpenAlexW3011884269MaRDI QIDQ2099065

Jipeng Zhang, Wooyoung Lim

Publication date: 22 November 2022

Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2019-0057

zbMATH Keywords

public goodspunishmentgroup sizeendogenous authority

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Experimental studies (91A90)

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

• Democracy and resilient pro-social behavioral change: an experimental study
• Do non-strategic sanctions obey the law of demand? The demand for punishment in the voluntary contribution mechanism
• Punishing free-riders: How group size affects mutual monitoring and the provision of public goods
• Punishment, counterpunishment and sanction enforcement in a social dilemma experiment
• Financing Public Goods by Means of Lotteries
• Choosing the Carrot or the Stick? Endogenous Institutional Choice in Social Dilemma Situations
• Coordinated Punishment of Defectors Sustains Cooperation and Can Proliferate When Rare
• Self-Organization for Collective Action: An Experimental Study of Voting on Sanction Regimes

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