Should the talk be cheap in contribution games?

DOI10.1515/bejte-2019-0082OpenAlexW3007204425MaRDI QIDQ2099069

Jen-Wen Chang

Publication date: 22 November 2022

Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2019-0082

zbMATH Keywords

commitmentcheap talkfree-ridingdynamic contribution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)

Cites Work

• How cheap talk enhances efficiency in threshold public goods games
• On sequential and simultaneous contributions under incomplete information
• Excludable public goods: pricing and social welfare maximization
• Testing for effects of cheap talk in a public goods game with private information
• An experimental investigation of excludable public goods
• Cheap talk, efficiency and egalitarian cost sharing in joint projects
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Asynchronicity and coordination in common and opposing interest games
• Joint Projects without Commitment

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