Prudent rationalizability in generalized extensive-form games with unawareness
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Publication:2099077
DOI10.1515/bejte-2020-2013OpenAlexW3035627063MaRDI QIDQ2099077
Burkhard C. Schipper, Martin Meier, Aviad Heifetz
Publication date: 22 November 2022
Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2020-2013
extensive-form rationalizabilityunawarenessiterated admissibilitydisclosureverifiable informationpersuasion gamescautioncommon strong cautious belief in rationality
Related Items (6)
Strategic reasoning in persuasion games: an experiment ⋮ An epistemic analysis of dynamic games with unawareness ⋮ Optimal delegation and information transmission under limited awareness ⋮ Discovery and equilibrium in games with unawareness ⋮ Introduction to the special issue on unawareness ⋮ Delegation and information disclosure with unforeseen contingencies
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