Delegation and information disclosure with unforeseen contingencies

DOI10.1515/BEJTE-2018-0184OpenAlexW3175553010MaRDI QIDQ2099084

Haoran Lei, Xiaojian Zhao

Publication date: 22 November 2022

Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2018-0184

zbMATH Keywords

unforeseen contingenciesdelegationunawarenessfinancial advice

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Actuarial science and mathematical finance (91G99)

Related Items (2)

Optimal delegation and information transmission under limited awareness ⋮ Introduction to the special issue on unawareness

Cites Work

• Incorporating unawareness into contract theory
• Multi-task agency with unawareness
• Framing contingencies in contracts
• Continuity in mechanism design without transfers
• Prudent rationalizability in generalized extensive-form games with unawareness
• Extensive games with possibly unaware players
• Vertically differentiated duopoly with unaware consumers
• Stochastic mechanisms in settings without monetary transfers: the regular case
• Dynamic unawareness and rationalizable behavior
• Asymmetric awareness and moral hazard
• A Model of Expertise
• The Theory of Optimal Delegation With an Application to Tariff Caps
• Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
• Incentives for Unaware Agents
• Optimal Delegation

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