Biasing dynamic contests between ex-ante symmetric players

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2022.07.005zbMath1505.91013OpenAlexW4293026702MaRDI QIDQ2100620

Marco Serena, Stefano Barbieri

Publication date: 24 November 2022

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.07.005

zbMATH Keywords

biasdynamic contestsmomentum effect

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

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