Biasing dynamic contests between ex-ante symmetric players
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Publication:2100620
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2022.07.005zbMath1505.91013OpenAlexW4293026702MaRDI QIDQ2100620
Marco Serena, Stefano Barbieri
Publication date: 24 November 2022
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.07.005
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