The possibility of Bayesian learning in repeated games

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2022.09.002zbMath1505.91070OpenAlexW4296545239MaRDI QIDQ2100624

Thomas W. L. Norman

Publication date: 24 November 2022

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.09.002

zbMATH Keywords

consistencyBayesian learningNash equilibriumrepeated gamesrational learning

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

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• Beliefs in Repeated Games

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