Appointed learning for the common good: optimal committee size and monetary transfers

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2022.04.005zbMath1505.91316OpenAlexW4293074764MaRDI QIDQ2100625

Oriol Tejada, Hans Gersbach, Akaki Mamageishvili

Publication date: 24 November 2022

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.04.005

zbMATH Keywords

majority rulevotinginformation acquisitionmonetary transferscommitteeincomplete social contracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10)

Cites Work

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• Representative Committees of Peers
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