The value of uncertainty in determining an expert's source of expertise

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2022.09.010zbMath1505.91109OpenAlexW4304689443MaRDI QIDQ2100647

Yanyan Li

Publication date: 24 November 2022

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.09.010

zbMATH Keywords

imperfect monitoringexpertsdynamic cheap talk

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

• Sustainable reputations with rating systems
• Impermanent types and permanent reputations
• Learning about analysts
• Information Acquisition and Reputation Dynamics
• The Market for Quacks
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations
• Who Wants a Good Reputation?

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