Leading to efficient coordination: individual traits, beliefs and choices in the minimum effort game
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Publication:2100650
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2022.10.003zbMath1505.91131OpenAlexW4306154636WikidataQ115205500 ScholiaQ115205500MaRDI QIDQ2100650
Peter G. Moffatt, Anita Gantner, Francesco Feri, Dominik Erharter
Publication date: 24 November 2022
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.10.003
Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Experimental studies (91A90)
Uses Software
Cites Work
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