The power of outside options in the presence of obstinate types
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Publication:2100653
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2022.10.011zbMath1505.91183OpenAlexW4307289567MaRDI QIDQ2100653
Leif Helland, Magnus Våge Knutsen, Tom-Reiel Heggedal
Publication date: 24 November 2022
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.10.011
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental work for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-05)
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