Axioms for the optimal stable rules and fair-division rules in a multiple-partners job market

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2022.10.005zbMath1505.91196OpenAlexW4306889101MaRDI QIDQ2100655

Gerard Domènech, Marina Núñez

Publication date: 24 November 2022

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.10.005

zbMATH Keywords

fair divisionassignment gamestable rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Labor markets (91B39)

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