A pessimist's approach to one-sided matching
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Publication:2103007
DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2022.07.013OpenAlexW4285404736MaRDI QIDQ2103007
Roel Leus, Dries R. Goossens, Ben Hermans, Tom Demeulemeester
Publication date: 12 December 2022
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2101.00579
assignmentprobabilistic assignmentprobabilistic serial mechanismrandom serial dictatorshipex-post Pareto-efficiency
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