Marginalism, egalitarianism and efficiency in multi-choice games

DOI10.1007/s00355-022-01412-8zbMath1505.91041OpenAlexW4281258796MaRDI QIDQ2103588

Publication date: 9 December 2022

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-022-01412-8

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (3)

Allocation rules for multi-choice games with a permission tree structure ⋮ Cost allocation in energy distribution networks ⋮ Priority relations and cooperation with multiple activity levels

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