Preference aggregation for couples

DOI10.1007/s00355-022-01413-7zbMath1505.91211OpenAlexW3048600008MaRDI QIDQ2103590

Rouzbeh Ghouchani, Szilvia Pápai

Publication date: 9 December 2022

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-022-01413-7

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Labor markets (91B39)

Cites Work

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• Corrigendum to ``stable matchings and preferences of couples
• Characterization of the private alternatives domains admitting Arrow social welfare functions
• Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues
• Stable matchings and preferences of couples
• Almost mutually best in matching markets: rank gaps and size of the core
• Matching of like rank and the size of the core in the marriage problem
• The core of roommate problems: size and rank-fairness within matched pairs
• Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask)
• Arrovian theorems for economic domains: Assignments, matchings and pairings
• Many-to-One Stable Matching: Geometry and Fairness

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