Self-implementation of social choice correspondences in Nash equilibrium

DOI10.1007/s00355-022-01420-8zbMath1505.91166OpenAlexW4285729708MaRDI QIDQ2103597

Yanyan Li

Publication date: 9 December 2022

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-022-01420-8

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

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