Exploiting social influence to control elections based on positional scoring rules

DOI10.1016/j.ic.2022.104940OpenAlexW4285097360MaRDI QIDQ2105422

Gianlorenzo D'Angelo, Stefano Ponziani, Federico Corò, Emilio Cruciani

Publication date: 8 December 2022

Published in: Information and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ic.2022.104940

zbMATH Keywords

social networksapproximation algorithmscomputational social choiceinfluence maximizationelection control

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Theory of computing (68Qxx)

Related Items (1)

Heuristics for opinion diffusion via local elections

Cites Work

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