Science, technology and institutional change in knowledge production: an evolutionary game theoretic framework

DOI10.1007/s13235-021-00416-wzbMath1505.91073OpenAlexW4206333499WikidataQ121087522 ScholiaQ121087522MaRDI QIDQ2105700

Erkan Gürpinar, Ozgur Aydogmus

Publication date: 8 December 2022

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-021-00416-w

zbMATH Keywords

technologyevolutionary gamesmultiplayer gamesscienceintellectual propertytacit knowledge

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Economics of information (91B44) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Cites Work

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• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• The Management of Innovation
• Deterministic Approximation of Stochastic Evolution in Games
• Probability

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