Ex-ante welfare superiority of the Boston mechanism over the deferred acceptance mechanism
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2105701
DOI10.1007/s13235-022-00446-yzbMath1505.91260OpenAlexW4224302850MaRDI QIDQ2105701
Publication date: 8 December 2022
Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-022-00446-y
incomplete informationschool choiceBoston mechanismex-ante welfareBayesian incentive compatibilitydeferred acceptance mechanism
Related Items (1)
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Comparing school choice mechanisms by interim and ex-ante welfare
- Asymmetric first-price auctions with uniform distributions: analytic solutions to the general case
- Boston versus deferred acceptance in an interim setting: an experimental investigation
- Ranking sealed high-bid and open asymmetric auctions
- Characterization and computation of Nash-equilibria for auctions with incomplete information
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- What matters in school choice tie-breaking? How competition guides design
- Information acquisition and provision in school choice: an experimental study
- School choice: an experimental study
- Truncation Strategies in Matching Markets
- The Average Number of Stable Matchings
- Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
- The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
- An Exact Analysis of Stable Allocation
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players Part II. Bayesian Equilibrium Points
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
This page was built for publication: Ex-ante welfare superiority of the Boston mechanism over the deferred acceptance mechanism
