Bipartite choices
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Publication:2105872
DOI10.1007/s10203-022-00380-zzbMath1505.91267OpenAlexW4309637780MaRDI QIDQ2105872
Publication date: 8 December 2022
Published in: Decisions in Economics and Finance (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10203-022-00380-z
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