Schelling redux: an evolutionary dynamic model of residential segregation

DOI10.3934/JDG.2022006zbMath1505.91287OpenAlexW2182702235MaRDI QIDQ2106063

Emin Dokumacı, William H. Sandholm

Publication date: 8 December 2022

Published in: Journal of Dynamics and Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2022006

zbMATH Keywords

stochastic stabilityevolutionary game theoryBayesian gamesBayesian best response dynamicresidential segregation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Mathematical geography and demography (91D20) Evolutionary games (91A22) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)

Related Items (1)

Tributes to Bill Sandholm

Cites Work

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• Evolution in Bayesian games. II: Stability of purified equilibria
• Evolution in Bayesian games. I: Theory
• Dynamic models of segregation†
• A DYNAMIC MODEL OF RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION

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