``Test two, choose the better leads to high cooperation in the centipede game
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Publication:2106067
DOI10.3934/jdg.2021018zbMath1505.91081OpenAlexW3163193002MaRDI QIDQ2106067
Segismundo S. Izquierdo, Luis R. Izquierdo
Publication date: 8 December 2022
Published in: Journal of Dynamics and Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2021018
simulationfinite populationcooperationevolutionary game dynamicsbackwards inductioncentipede gamebest experienced payoff dynamics
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Cites Work
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