Stochastic stability in the large population and small mutation limits for coordination games
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Publication:2106070
DOI10.3934/jdg.2021015zbMath1505.91086OpenAlexW3159143704MaRDI QIDQ2106070
Publication date: 8 December 2022
Published in: Journal of Dynamics and Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2021015
Markov chains (discrete-time Markov processes on discrete state spaces) (60J10) Large deviations (60F10) Evolutionary games (91A22) Equilibrium refinements (91A11)
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