Power indices for networks, with applications to matching markets
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Publication:2106759
DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2022.07.014OpenAlexW4285735842MaRDI QIDQ2106759
Publication date: 19 December 2022
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2022.07.014
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