Information revelation through signalling

DOI10.1016/J.SYSCONLE.2022.105378zbMath1505.91106arXiv2202.10145OpenAlexW4304694840MaRDI QIDQ2107616

Reema Deori, Ankur A. Kulkarni

Publication date: 2 December 2022

Published in: Systems \& Control Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2202.10145

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryinformationsignalling gamesdecentralized systems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Decentralized systems (93A14) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

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• Strategic Information Transmission
• Quadratic Privacy-Signaling Games and the MMSE Information Bottleneck Problem for Gaussian Sources
• Signaling Games for Log-Concave Distributions: Number of Bins and Properties of Equilibria

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