Evolutionary dynamics of compliance in a two-population game of auditors and taxpayers

DOI10.1016/J.CNSNS.2022.106945zbMath1505.91078OpenAlexW4306407338MaRDI QIDQ2108702

Domenico De Giovanni, Mario Pezzino, Fabio Lamantia

Publication date: 20 December 2022

Published in: Communications in Nonlinear Science and Numerical Simulation (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cnsns.2022.106945

zbMATH Keywords

social normstax evasionevolutionary gamesbriberyauditing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Mathematical economics (91B99) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (2)

The dynamics of corruption under an optional external supervision service ⋮ Game modeling of collusion and influential factors under uniform taxpayer distribution

Cites Work

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• Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• A Theory of Collective Reputations (with Applications to the Persistence of Corruption and to Firm Quality)
• Evolutionary Tax Evasion, Prospect Theory and Heterogeneous Taxpayers
• The economics of cultural transmission and the dynamics of preferences

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