Merger effects in asymmetric and differentiated Bertrand oligopolies

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2022.09.002zbMath1503.91068OpenAlexW4297142651MaRDI QIDQ2108762

Jingang Zhao, X. Henry Wang

Publication date: 20 December 2022

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2022.09.002

zbMATH Keywords

horizontal mergerBertrand competitionconsumer surpluswelfare reduction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Cites Work

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• GLOBALIZATION AND MULTIPRODUCT FIRMS
• Antitrust Evaluation of Horizontal Mergers: An Economic Alternative to Market Definition
• Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume I
• Equilibrium points in n -person games

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