Deferred acceptance algorithm with retrade
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2108764
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2022.08.004zbMath1505.91136OpenAlexW4298007256MaRDI QIDQ2108764
Megumi Murakami, Akihiko Matsui
Publication date: 20 December 2022
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2022.08.004
cyclical prioritydeferred acceptance algorithm (DA) with retrademinimum demandperfect market equilibrium (PME)reversed priority
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Mechanism design theory (91B03)
Related Items (1)
Cites Work
- A note on the strong core of a market with indivisible goods
- The existence and computation of competitive equilibria in markets with an indivisible commodity
- Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- On cores and indivisibility
- Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
- Dynamics, stability, and foresight in the Shapley-Scarf housing market
- Stability in dynamic matching markets
- Markovian assignment rules
- The stability of the equilibrium outcomes in the admission games induced by stable matching rules
- The assignment game. I: The core
- Robust stability in matching markets
- Axioms for Deferred Acceptance
- Integral Boundary Points of Convex Polyhedra
- The College Admissions Problem Revisited
- Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
- The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
- Implementation and Renegotiation
- Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
- MULTIPERIOD MATCHING
- Resale Markets and the Assignment of Property Rights
- Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Coalition strategy-proofness and monotonicity in Shapley-Scarf housing markets
This page was built for publication: Deferred acceptance algorithm with retrade
