Psychological Nash equilibria under ambiguity

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2022.09.005zbMath1505.91024OpenAlexW3194172745MaRDI QIDQ2108770

Alba Roviello, Giuseppe De Marco, Maria Romaniello

Publication date: 20 December 2022

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2022.09.005

zbMATH Keywords

equilibrium selectionequilibrium existencepsychological gamesambiguous beliefs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Utility theory for games (91A30) Equilibrium refinements (91A11)

Cites Work

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