Psychological Nash equilibria under ambiguity
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Publication:2108770
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2022.09.005zbMath1505.91024OpenAlexW3194172745MaRDI QIDQ2108770
Alba Roviello, Giuseppe De Marco, Maria Romaniello
Publication date: 20 December 2022
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2022.09.005
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