The market for lemons and information theory

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2022.10.002zbMath1505.91105OpenAlexW4306167256MaRDI QIDQ2108772

Robert Mamada

Publication date: 20 December 2022

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2022.10.002

zbMATH Keywords

mutual informationindexinformation theoryadverse selectionsequential Bayesian game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)

Cites Work

• Price signaling and the strategic benefits of price rigidities
• A scent of lemon -- seller meets buyer with a noisy quality observation

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