Optimal control for transboundary pollution under inter-temporal transfer of emission permits: a differential game approach

DOI10.1016/j.apm.2022.09.013zbMath1505.91274OpenAlexW4296050176MaRDI QIDQ2110849

Jiayuan Yang, Ruixiang Xu, Zuliang Lu, Fei Cai, Lu Xing

Publication date: 23 December 2022

Published in: Applied Mathematical Modelling (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apm.2022.09.013

zbMATH Keywords

game theorytransboundary pollutionemission permitsspatial dimensionsinter-temporal banking and borrowing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Differential games and control (49N70) Applications of optimal control and differential games (49N90) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Ecology (92D40)

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Cites Work

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