Majority properties of positional social preference correspondences
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Publication:2114567
DOI10.1007/s11238-021-09828-xzbMath1484.91170OpenAlexW3172016969MaRDI QIDQ2114567
Publication date: 15 March 2022
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://crese.univ-fcomte.fr/uploads/wp/WP-2020-06.pdf
Uses Software
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