Every normal-form game has a Pareto-optimal nonmyopic equilibrium

DOI10.1007/s11238-021-09824-1zbMath1484.91015OpenAlexW3173983348MaRDI QIDQ2114569

Steven J. Brams, Mehmet S. Ismail

Publication date: 15 March 2022

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-021-09824-1

zbMATH Keywords

game theorycooperationfarsightednessdynamic analysis of gamesnonmyopic equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Equilibrium refinements (91A11)

Related Items (1)

Rational play in extensive-form games

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Subgame-perfection in recursive perfect information games, where each player controls one state
• Equilibria for far-sighted players
• Long-term behavior in the theory of moves
• Deterministic multi-player Dynkin games.
• Subgame Perfection in Positive Recursive Games with Perfect Information
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
• Rational expectations and farsighted stability
• Theory of Moves
• Stochastic Games

This page was built for publication: Every normal-form game has a Pareto-optimal nonmyopic equilibrium