Strategic manipulation in judgment aggregation under higher-level reasoning

DOI10.1007/s11238-021-09833-0zbMath1484.91176OpenAlexW3180633818MaRDI QIDQ2114570

Zoi Terzopoulou, Ulle Endriss

Publication date: 15 March 2022

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-021-09833-0

zbMATH Keywords

social choice theoryvotingjudgment aggregationmanipulation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
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• Multiagent Systems
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games
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• The Complexity Landscape of Outcome Determination in Judgment Aggregation
• Logics in Artificial Intelligence

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