Weak selection helps cheap but harms expensive cooperation in spatial threshold dilemmas

DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2021.110995zbMath1483.92103OpenAlexW4206159051MaRDI QIDQ2115989

István Scheuring, Tamás Czárán

Publication date: 15 March 2022

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2021.110995

zbMATH Keywords

spatial patternnonlinear public goodsstochastic replicator dynamics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Cites Work

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