Collateral misrepresentation, external auditing, and optimal supervisory policy

DOI10.1007/S11079-021-09657-ZzbMath1485.91158OpenAlexW4210545465WikidataQ113444849 ScholiaQ113444849MaRDI QIDQ2121126

Fatih Tuluk

Publication date: 1 April 2022

Published in: Open Economies Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11079-021-09657-z

zbMATH Keywords

asset misrepresentationexternal auditingreach for yieldsupervisory policy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Cites Work

• Scarce collateral, the term premium, and quantitative easing
• Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
• Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity
• Search for Yield
• Hazardous Times for Monetary Policy: What Do Twenty-Three Million Bank Loans Say About the Effects of Monetary Policy on Credit Risk-Taking?
• Money in Search Equilibrium, in Competitive Equilibrium, and in Competitive Search Equilibrium

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