Correlates of crisis induced credit market discipline: the roles of democracy, veto players, and government turnover

DOI10.1007/S11079-021-09630-WzbMath1485.91239OpenAlexW3095375031MaRDI QIDQ2121143

Jacob M. Meyer, Eric M. P. Chiu, Puspa D. Amri, Thomas D. Willett, Greg M. Richey

Publication date: 1 April 2022

Published in: Open Economies Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11079-021-09630-w

zbMATH Keywords

financial crisespolicy learningeconomic reformspolitical institutionsdisciplinecredit growth

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Financial networks (including contagion, systemic risk, regulation) (91G45)

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