The complexity of online bribery in sequential elections
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Publication:2121471
DOI10.1016/j.jcss.2022.01.006zbMath1483.68144arXiv1906.08308OpenAlexW4212796068MaRDI QIDQ2121471
Edith Hemaspaandra, Jörg Rothe, Hemaspaandra, Lane A.
Publication date: 4 April 2022
Published in: Journal of Computer and System Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1906.08308
computational complexitylogiccomputational social choicebriberyquantifier assignmentsequential elections
Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Voting theory (91B12) Logic in computer science (03B70) History, political science (91F10) Social choice (91B14)
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