Proofs, grounds and empty functions: epistemic compulsion in Prawitz's semantics

DOI10.1007/s10992-021-09621-9OpenAlexW3189096178WikidataQ113900776 ScholiaQ113900776MaRDI QIDQ2121478

Antonio Piccolomini d'Aragona

Publication date: 4 April 2022

Published in: Journal of Philosophical Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-021-09621-9

zbMATH Keywords

validityinferenceproofgroundingepistemic compulsion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mathematical logic and foundations (03-XX)

Cites Work

• The epistemic significance of valid inference
• Dag Prawitz on proofs and meaning
• Intuitionism. An introduction
• Constructions, proofs and the meaning of logical constants
• Constructivism in mathematics. An introduction. Volume II
• Five observations concerning the intended meaning of the intuitionistic logical constants
• The seeming interdependence between the concepts of valid inference and proof
• Dag Prawitz on proofs, operations and grounding
• Validity concepts in proof-theoretic semantics
• The fundamental problem of general proof theory
• The Concepts of Proof and Ground
• Meaning and proofs: on the conflict between classical and intuitionistic logic
• A Notion of C-Justification for Empirical Statements
• An Approach to General Proof Theory and a Conjecture of a Kind of Completeness of Intuitionistic Logic Revisited
• Truth and Proof in Intuitionism
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