Learning Machiavellian strategies for manipulation in Stackelberg security games
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Publication:2122770
DOI10.1007/s10472-022-09788-0OpenAlexW4210963402MaRDI QIDQ2122770
Publication date: 7 April 2022
Published in: Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10472-022-09788-0
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